投稿者
木村愛二 日時 2006 年 9 月 16 日 21:14:31: CjMHiEP28ibKM
イスラムは「邪悪」と発言=ローマ法王発言に怒り広がる [時事通信]
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20060915-00000114-jij-int
【ニューデリー15日時事】ローマ法王ベネディクト16世が、イスラム教が本質的に暴力を容認する宗教であるかのような発言をし、イスラム諸国から怒りの声が相次いでいる。2001年9月の米同時テロ以来、欧米の一部にはイスラムの教義そのものに暴力の原因を求める議論があり、イスラム教徒の神経を逆なでしてきた。パキスタン議会は15日、法王に発言の撤回を求める非難決議を全会一致で採択した。
ローマ法王は12日、訪問先の母国ドイツの大学で行った講義で、東ローマ帝国皇帝によるイスラム批判に触れ、「(イスラム教開祖の)預言者ムハンマドが新たにもたらしたものを見せてほしい。それは邪悪と残酷だけだ」などと指摘。その上で、イスラムの教えるジハード(聖戦)の概念を批判した。
(時事通信) -
9月15日19時2分更新
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ローマ法王発言に謝罪要求広がる [AFP=時事]
http://news.www.infoseek.co.jp/afp/society/story/20060915afpAFP008684/
【パリ15日】ローマ法王ベネディクト16世≪写真≫が、イスラム教が本質的に暴力を容認する宗教であるかのような発言をし、イスラム諸国から謝罪を求める声が相次いでいる。パキスタン議会は15日、法王に発言の撤回を求める非難決議を全会一致で採択。同国外務省当局者は法王を無知だと非難した。
ローマ法王は12日、訪問先の母国ドイツの大学で行った講義で、イスラム教と暴力の関係について言及した上で、とくにジハード(聖戦)の概念を批判。さらに、イスラム教開祖の預言者ムハンマドが新たにもたらしたものを見せてほしい。それは邪悪と残酷だけだなどと発言した。
ローマ法王庁スポークスマンはその後、声明を出し、ローマ法王はイスラム教には敬意を払っているが、宗教によって動機付けられた暴力は拒否すると強調した。
これに対してフランス・イスラム評議会最高幹部は、教会は法王の発言に対して直ちに彼らの立場を明らかにするべきだと指摘。クェートやエジプトのイスラム指導者は法王に対して早急な謝罪を求めている。
[2006年9月15日20時17分]
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[ローマ法王]「聖戦」批判演説にイスラム社会の反発広がる (毎日新聞)
http://news.livedoor.com/webapp/journal/cid__2451346/detail?rd
【ローマ海保真人】ローマ法王ベネディクト16世がイスラム原理主義の「聖戦」を批判した演説に対してイスラム社会で法王を非難する動きが拡大している。パキスタン下院議会が15日、法王に発言撤回を求める決議を採択したのをはじめ、イラン、インドネシア、トルコなどでもイスラム教指導者が反発し、一部が抗議行動を呼び掛けた。ローマ法王庁(バチカン)は釈明し、火消しに躍起になっている。
法王はドイツ訪問中の12日、大学での演説で「ジハード(聖戦)は神に反する」と述べ、テロの宗教的根拠を否定。さらに、イスラム教の預言者ムハンマドが「戦いの指揮により邪悪と残酷さをもたらした」という14世紀のビザンチン帝国皇帝の言葉を引用した。
ムハンマドに関する発言が特にイスラム社会で反発を招き、パキスタン下院議会は決議で「法王発言はイスラム教徒の感情を傷つけた」と発言の撤回を要求。また、イランの有力なイスラム教指導者は「法王はイスラム教を侮辱した」と非難した。
さらにロイター通信によると、インドネシアのイスラム教指導者は「法王はイスラム教を正しく理解していない」と指摘し、信徒に抗議行動を起こすよう呼び掛けた。トルコ政府の宗教担当高官も発言について「極めて遺憾だ」と述べ、11月末に予定されている法王のトルコ訪問に疑問を呈した。エジプトやヨルダンなどでも法王に謝罪を求める声が高まっている。
一方、パレスチナ自治区ガザ市にあるギリシャ正教会の施設では15日、小規模の爆発が起きたが、法王発言に対する反発によるものかどうかは分かっていない。
バチカンのロンバルディ報道官は声明で「法王はジハード思想について深く踏み込むつもりはなく、イスラム教徒の感情を害する気持ちもない。ただ、暴力のために宗教を動機とすることを明確に否定したいだけだ」と述べた。報道官は法王がイスラム教との調和を求める姿勢に変わりがないことを強調した。
だが、今年初めにはデンマークの新聞が掲載したムハンマドの風刺画をきっかけにイスラム教徒が世界規模で抗議行動を起こす騒ぎとなった。今回もキリスト教徒に対する反発がイスラム社会で膨らむ恐れがある。
2006年09月15日21時31分
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●問題となっているローマ教皇演説の全文
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http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=94748
ZENIT
- The World Seen From Rome
Code: ZE06091209
Date:
2006-09-12
Papal Address at University of Regensburg
"Three Stages
in the Program of De-Hellenization"
REGENSBURG, Germany, SEPT. 12, 2006
(Zenit.org).- Here is a Vatican translation of the address Benedict XVI
delivered to scientists at the University of Regensburg, where he was a
professor and vice rector from 1969 to 1971.
This is the version the
Pope read, adding some allusions of the moment, which he hopes to publish in the
future, complete with footnotes. Hence, the present text must be considered
provisional.
* * *
Faith, Reason and the University
Memories
and Reflections
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a
moving experience for me to stand and give a lecture at this university podium
once again. I think back to those years when, after a pleasant period at the
Freisinger Hochschule, I began teaching at the University of Bonn. This was in
1959, in the days of the old university made up of ordinary professors. The
various chairs had neither assistants nor secretaries, but in recompense there
was much direct contact with students and in particular among the professors
themselves. We would meet before and after lessons in the rooms of the teaching
staff. There was a lively exchange with historians, philosophers, philologists
and, naturally, between the two theological faculties.
Once a semester
there was a "dies academicus," when professors from every faculty appeared
before the students of the entire university, making possible a genuine
experience of "universitas": The reality that despite our specializations which
at times make it difficult to communicate with each other, we made up a whole,
working in everything on the basis of a single rationality with its various
aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of reason -- this reality
became a lived experience.
The university was also very proud of its two
theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness
of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the "whole"
of the "universitas scientiarum," even if not everyone could share the faith
which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense
of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was
once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our
university: It had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God.
That even in the face of such radical skepticism it is still necessary and
reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so
in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: This, within the
university as a whole, was accepted without question.
I was reminded of
all this recently, when I read the edition by professor Theodore Khoury
(Muenster) of part of the dialogue carried on -- perhaps in 1391 in the winter
barracks near Ankara -- by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus
and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth
of both.
It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue,
during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain
why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned
Persian. The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in
the Bible and in the Koran, and deals especially with the image of God and of
man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the "three
Laws": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Koran.
In this
lecture I would like to discuss only one point -- itself rather marginal to the
dialogue itself -- which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason," I
found interesting and which can serve as the starting point for my reflections
on this issue.
In the seventh conversation ("di?esis" -- controversy)
edited by professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy
war). The emperor must have known that sura 2:256 reads: "There is no compulsion
in religion." It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was
still powerless and under [threat]. But naturally the emperor also knew the
instructions, developed later and recorded in the Koran, concerning holy war.
Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment
accorded to those who have the "Book" and the "infidels," he turns to his
interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship
between religion and violence in general, in these words: "Show me just what
Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and
inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."
The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the
faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with
the nature of God and the nature of the soul. "God is not pleased by blood, and
not acting reasonably ("syn logo") is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of
the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to
speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats.... To convince
a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or
any other means of threatening a person with death...."
The decisive
statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: Not to act in
accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury,
observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this
statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely
transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of
rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez,
who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even
by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us.
Were it God's will, we would even have to practice idolatry.
As far as
understanding of God and thus the concrete practice of religion is concerned, we
find ourselves faced with a dilemma which nowadays challenges us directly. Is
the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature merely a Greek
idea, or is it always and intrinsically true?
I believe that here we can
see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and
the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the
Book of Genesis, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: "In the
beginning was the 'logos.'"
This is the very word used by the emperor:
God acts with logos. Logos means both reason and word -- a reason which is
creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John thus spoke
the final word on the biblical concept of God, and in this word all the often
toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith find their culmination and
synthesis. In the beginning was the logos, and the logos is God, says the
Evangelist. The encounter between the biblical message and Greek thought did not
happen by chance.
The vision of St. Paul, who saw the roads to Asia
barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: "Come over to
Macedonia and help us!" (cf. Acts 16:6-10) -- this vision can be interpreted as
a "distillation" of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between biblical
faith and Greek inquiry.
In point of fact, this rapprochement had been
going on for some time. The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning
bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many
names and declares simply that he is, already presents a challenge to the notion
of myth, to which Socrates' attempt to vanquish and transcend myth stands in
close analogy. Within the Old Testament, the process which started at the
burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, when the God of
Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, was proclaimed as the
God of heaven and earth and described in a simple formula which echoes the words
uttered at the burning bush: "I am."
This new understanding of God is
accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, which finds stark expression in the
mockery of gods who are merely the work of human hands (cf. Psalm 115). Thus,
despite the bitter conflict with those Hellenistic rulers who sought to
accommodate it forcibly to the customs and idolatrous cult of the Greeks,
biblical faith, in the Hellenistic period, encountered the best of Greek thought
at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident especially in the
later wisdom literature.
Today we know that the Greek translation of the
Old Testament produced at Alexandria -- the Septuagint -- is more than a simple
(and in that sense perhaps less than satisfactory) translation of the Hebrew
text: It is an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in
the history of Revelation, one which brought about this encounter in a way that
was decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity. A profound encounter of
faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine
enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the
same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to
say: Not to act "with logos" is contrary to God's nature.
In all
honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in
theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the
Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine
and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which ultimately led to
the claim that we can only know God's "voluntas ordinata." Beyond this is the
realm of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of
everything he has actually done.
This gives rise to positions which
clearly approach those of Ibn Hazn and might even lead to the image of a
capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God's transcendence
and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good,
are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain
eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions.
As
opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God
and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a
real analogy, in which unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet
not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language (cf. Lateran IV).
God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a
sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has
revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly
on our behalf. Certainly, love "transcends" knowledge and is thereby capable of
perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Ephesians 3:19); nonetheless it
continues to be love of the God who is logos. Consequently, Christian worship is
"logic latre誕" -- worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason
(cf. Romans 12:1).
This inner rapprochement between biblical faith and
Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from
the standpoint of the history of religions, but also from that of world history
-- it is an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is
not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant
developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in
Europe. We can also express this the other way around: This convergence, with
the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage, created Europe and remains the
foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.
The thesis that the
critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith has
been countered by the call for a de-Hellenization of Christianity -- a call
which has more and more dominated theological discussions since the beginning of
the modern age. Viewed more closely, three stages can be observed in the program
of de-Hellenization: Although interconnected, they are clearly distinct from one
another in their motivations and objectives.
De-Hellenization first
emerges in connection with the fundamental postulates of the Reformation in the
16th century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers
thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by
philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system
of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word
but as one element of an overarching philosophical system.
The principle
of "sola scriptura," on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial
form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a
premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in
order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set
thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this program forward
with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored
faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.
The liberal theology of the 19th and 20th centuries ushered in a second
stage in the process of de-Hellenization, with Adolf von Harnack as its
outstanding representative. When I was a student, and in the early years of my
teaching, this program was highly influential in Catholic theology too. It took
as its point of departure Pascal's distinction between the God of the
philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
In my inaugural
lecture at Bonn in 1959, I tried to address the issue. I will not repeat here
what I said on that occasion, but I would like to describe at least briefly what
was new about this second stage of de-Hellenization. Harnack's central idea was
to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message, underneath the
accretions of theology and indeed of Hellenization: This simple message was seen
as the culmination of the religious development of humanity. Jesus was said to
have put an end to worship in favor of morality. In the end he was presented as
the father of a humanitarian moral message.
The fundamental goal was to
bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is
to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in
Christ's divinity and the triune God. In this sense, historical-critical
exegesis of the New Testament restored to theology its place within the
university: Theology, for Harnack, is something essentially historical and
therefore strictly scientific. What it is able to say critically about Jesus is,
so to speak, an expression of practical reason and consequently it can take its
rightful place within the university.
Behind this thinking lies the
modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in Kant's "Critiques,"
but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the natural sciences.
This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis
between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the
success of technology.
On the one hand it presupposes the mathematical
structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to
understand how matter works and use it efficiently: This basic premise is, so to
speak, the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature. On the other
hand, there is nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only
the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can
yield ultimate certainty. The weight between the two poles can, depending on the
circumstances, shift from one side to the other. As strongly positivistic a
thinker as J. Monod has declared himself a convinced Platonist/Cartesian.
This gives rise to two principles which are crucial for the issue we
have raised. First, only the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay of
mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. Anything that
would claim to be science must be measured against this criterion. Hence the
human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology and philosophy, attempt
to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity.
A second point,
which is important for our reflections, is that by its very nature this method
excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific
question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science
and reason, one which needs to be questioned.
We shall return to this
problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint
any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up
reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say
more: It is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human
questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and
ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by
"science" and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective.
The
subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable
in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter
of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to
create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous
state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of
religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that
questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an
ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being
simply inadequate.
Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has
been leading, I must briefly refer to the third stage of de-Hellenization, which
is now in progress. In the light of our experience with cultural pluralism, it
is often said nowadays that the synthesis with Hellenism achieved in the early
Church was a preliminary inculturation which ought not to be binding on other
cultures.
The latter are said to have the right to return to the simple
message of the New Testament prior to that inculturation, in order to
inculturate it anew in their own particular milieux. This thesis is not only
false; it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in
Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which had already come to
maturity as the Old Testament developed.
True, there are elements in the
evolution of the early Church which do not have to be integrated into all
cultures. Nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship
between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are
developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.
And so I come to
my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern
reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time
before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The
positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: We are all
grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and
for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos,
moreover, is the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an
attitude which reflects one of the basic tenets of Christianity.
The
intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of
broadening our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the
new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these
possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them.
We
will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if
we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable,
and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly
belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not
merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely
as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.
Only thus do we
become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently
needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic
reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the
world's profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the
universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions.
A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into
the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures.
At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its
intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points
beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology. Modern scientific
reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the
correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of
nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based.
Yet the
question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be
remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought -- to
philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for
theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious
traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a
source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of
our listening and responding.
Here I am reminded of something Socrates
said to Phaedo. In their earlier conversations, many false philosophical
opinions had been raised, and so Socrates says: "It would be easily
understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for
the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being -- but in this
way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great
loss."
The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the
questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm
thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial
of its grandeur -- this is the program with which a theology grounded in
biblical faith enters into the debates of our time.
"Not to act
reasonably (with logos) is contrary to the nature of God," said Manuel II,
according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian
interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we
invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is
the great task of the university.
[Translation of German original
issued by the Holy See; adapted]
-----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright
2006 -- Libreria Editrice Vaticana
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